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Abstract 
The financial crisis, and associated scandals, created a sense of a juridical deficit 
with regard to the financial sector. Forms of independent judgement within the sector 
appeared compromised, while judgement over the sector seemed unattainable. 
Elites, in the classical Millsian sense of those taking tacitly coordinated, ‘big 
decisions’ over the rest of the public, seem absent. This article argues that the 
eradication of jurisdictional elites is an effect of neoliberalism, as articulated most 
coherently by Hayek. It characterises the neoliberal project as an effort to elevate 
‘unconscious’ processes over ‘conscious’ ones, which in practice means elevating 
cybernetic, non-human systems and processes over discursive spheres of politics 
and judgement. Yet such a system still produces its own types of elite power, which 
come to consist in acts of translation, rather than judgment. Firstly, there are ‘cyborg 
intermediaries’: elites which operate largely within the system of codes, data, screens 
and prices. Secondly, there are ‘diplomatic intermediaries’: elites who come to 
narrate and justify what markets (and associated technologies and bodies) are 
‘saying’. The paper draws on Lazzarato’s work on signifiying vs asignifying semiotics 
in order to articulate this, and concludes by considering the types of elite crisis which 
these forms of power tend to produce. 
 
Keywords: elites, neoliberalism, finance, Hayek, capitalism, Lazzarato 
 
Word Length: 9794 
 
 
 
  
 2 
  
 
In the aftermath of the banking crises of 2007-09, and amidst subsequent scandals 
such as Libor-fixing, there was a palpable public sentiment that judgement was not 
being adequately cast over financial elites. While a handful of proven criminals were 
jailed in the US, UK and elsewhere, the sense that bankers had 'got away with it' was 
widespread. Fines placed on Wall Street banks between 2009-14 only amounted to 
26% of the profits made over the same period, while just one Wall Street executive 
was jailed (Cohan, 2015; Spross, 2015). To fill the vacuum of normative regulation, 
recriminations took on an air of pre-modernity. In 2012, Fred Goodwin, the former 
CEO of UK bank RBS, was stripped of the Knighthood he had been awarded in 2004 
for "services to banking". A ‘bankers oath’ was introduced in Holland in 2013, 
concluding with the words “so help me God”. Warren Buffett argued that only the 
threat of incarceration was sufficient to alter the behavior of Wall Street bankers. 
Others have suggested that banks be stripped of the protection of limited liability, 
which would shrink banking to a mid-Victorian scale of risk-taking, and place 
potentially ruinous levels of liability upon bankers as well as shareholders (Haldane, 
2011). 
 
In addition to the deficiency of legal judgement, there was a sense that the systems 
of judgement and accountability used within the financial system had become 
subverted by monetary incentives and cultural intimacy. The capacity for 
disinterested judgement had been destroyed. Credit-rating agencies and Big Four 
accounting firms, whose judgments of risk and propriety are critical for the public 
accountability of financial and non-financial firms, were revealed by investigative 
journalists as working to manipulate profit and risk calculations on behalf of clients 
(Lewis, 2011; Shaxson, 2011; ICIJ, 2014). The UK's Competition Commission 
reported that the Big Four were not fulfilling their duty as auditors, due to excessive 
proximity to the managers of firms they audit (Competition Commission, 2013).  
 
These various scandals and crises suggest a widespread collapse of juridical reason 
as a symptom and malaise of financialisation. Financial institutions and agencies 
appear to undermine the capacity for independent, objective judgement over the 
'facts' of what is taking place, while the complexity of institutions and instruments is 
such that very few external public or juridical actors are able to form judgments from 
positions of liberal disinterestedness. The offshoring of financial capital to escape 
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taxation and regulation is now well-recognised, but it is also enabling a new class of 
extra-juridical elites, who are able to operate outside of ordinary legal norms of 
citizenship, such as the requirement to show a passport when crossing borders 
(Harrington, 2015). And even after a crisis that cost some national economies a sum 
comparable to that of a world war (Haldane, 2012b), the search for judgement and 
justice seemed equally frustrated, hence appeals to pre-modern policies such as 
oaths.  
 
These events put strain on the conventional concept of 'elites', as proposed in the 
classical formulations of Mills and Dahl, and which some scholars have sought to 
revive in the context of rising inequality and financialisation (Mills, 1999; Dahl, 1958; 
Savage & Williams, 2008a; Kahn, 2012). For while it is now abundantly clear that a 
small minority of executives and financial intermediaries are benefiting hugely from 
finance-led capitalism (Piketty, 2014; Dorling, 2014), those individuals and agencies 
lack the public, cultural or political status that elites have traditionally been accredited 
with, for better or worse. One of the sociological challenges of contemporary 
inequality is how to treat concentrations of wealth as a private, domestic, monetary 
and economic phenomenon, and not assume that this is translated into (or derived 
from) political power, public status or cultural capital, as Weberian and Bourdieusian 
traditions have done (Savage, 2014a, 2014b). The financial elite today is arguably 
characterised by an absence of public identity, and an absence of juridical reason, 
whereas the classical theory of elites places them in relation to a liberal public 
sphere, even if they lack a Kantian spirit of disinterestedness in their engagement 
with it. The Millsian problem of elites is one of rival political jurisdictions - over 
corporations, state, military - just as professions are conceived as rival 
epistemological jurisdictions (Abbott, 1988), which combine to form a jurisdiction over 
the public at large. But financial elites neither exercise nor recognise juridical reason, 
in the sense of exercise of public judgement. 
 
One way in which this new elite formation has been theorised is via the concept of 
the "capillary power" of finance (Savage & Williams, 2008b). Savage and Williams 
suggest that the Millsian theory of elites needs updating, both in light of post-
structuralist critiques of agency, and in view of the rise of decentralised, highly 
mediated, technical networks in the financial economy. As they argue, "the challenge 
in present day capitalism is to understand the disorganizing power of finance 
materialized in a loose distributive coalition of intermediaries whose power works 
unpredictably through temptation" (Savage & Williams, 2008b: 12). As per 
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Foucauldian and Latourian accounts of power, contemporary elites are no longer 
centralised in hierarchical institutions of the sort that concerned Mills. The power of 
financial intermediaries lies partly in their capacity to act without the trappings of 
authority or public status.  
 
This article does not contradict that diagnosis of the problem, but seeks to build on it 
by considering contemporary elite power as 'post-juridical', in the sense that it exists 
outside of any norms of discourse or conducts. This is not true of all forms of 
"capillary power". Foucauldian 'discipline' is resolutely normative, indeed normalising, 
in its methods and effects. Institutions of 'discipline' are decentralised and micro-
political; but they share certain normative patterns with more public or macro-
institutions, such as professional associations, market regulation, bureaucracies and 
so on. These technologies are tangible effects of discourses which are prior to them. 
A major challenge of liberal government, from a Foucauldian perspective, is precisely 
how to convert macro-political goals into micro-political techniques and interventions 
(Rose & Miller, 2010). 'Disciplinary power' is therefore compatible with the notion of 
'hegemony', for both imply an a priori principle which is to be applied in general 
(Lash, 2007). The challenge posed by contemporary financial elites is not only that 
their power is "capillary" in nature, but that it is not authorised by any public, 
normative or juridical regime which exists prior to the power itself, making it "post-
hegemonic" or "exceptional" in nature (Davies, 2013, 2016). The power of finance is 
less that of normative 'discipline', and more that of constantly reactive 'control' 
(Deleuze, 1992). The desperation for a juridical principle to be reasserted over 
finance reflects a nostalgic longing for a priori reason, even if it has a somewhat 
mediaeval hue.    
 
Conceived in a post-juridical sense, elites are neither inside nor outside of the law, 
neither applying rules nor breaking them. So how might we understand them, in a 
political and pragmatist sense? The argument to be developed here is that their 
power consists in the power of translation, and that this is in keeping with a long-
standing neoliberal critique of professional, political and epistemological authority. 
When liberal disciplines, methodologies, laws and regulations are abandoned in 
favour of cybernetic systems of digits, machines and prices (including those of 
markets), what remains is a type of elite power which interprets what is on the 
screen, explains what it means, converts it into narrative, but possesses no 
authorship or authority over it. The elite becomes the go-between, communicating 
what 'the markets' (or other machines) are saying, for a liberal, public audience which 
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is otherwise excluded from such knowledge. This elite power was noticed in the early 
1990s by sociologists seeking to understand why globalisation appeared to still 
privilege certain cultures and territories, often being described as an embedded class 
of "symbolic analysts" (Sassen, 1991; Reich, 2010; Castells, 1996). But beyond its 
economic geography, the cultural, technological and political dimensions of this elite 
were less studied. This elite inhabits and interprets an encoded semiotic system 
which derives from machines, rather than from political or juridical discourse. 
Lazzarato’s rich analysis of ‘machinic enslavement’ and ‘asignifying semiotics’ offers 
a useful theoretical starting point for critical reflection on this, as I shall explore 
(Lazzarato, 2014).  
 
To interpret this post-juridical variety of elite power, I will highlight certain resonances 
and differences between the classical Millsian critique of elites and the definitively 
neoliberal critique of ‘intellectuals’ and ‘planners’ developed by Friedrich Hayek and 
some of his associates. Where Mills was concerned that elites had become too 
concentrated and too distant from the demos, Hayek’s specific anxiety was that elites 
had conscious objectives for society in mind. Neoliberalism, interpreted via Hayek, 
can therefore be understood as an attempt to imagine and design a new form of elite 
power, which lacks the aspiration to act on behalf of the public. The absence of 
juridical reason in our financial system today may be understood as the logical 
outcome of this model of critique which elevates unconscious decisions over 
conscious ones. In a world transformed by neoliberal reason, the Millsian critique 
loses some purchase, because elites are no longer configured along the lines of 
Weberian law-enforcers. The question is how to define them otherwise, to which I 
offer an ideal type of the power of translation.    
 
The rest of the article is in four sections. Firstly, I return to the classical theory of 
elites as presented by Mills, highlighting its Weberian assumptions and juridical - that 
is, procedurally rational - view of power. Whether viewed critically (as Mills did) or 
enthusiastically (either for conservative or pluralist reasons), elites of this nature held 
public status, forms of authority, and public oversight. The original question of elite 
studies was a liberal one: do elite jurisdictions overlap and conspire, rendering them 
illegitimate, or hold each other in check as pluralists argue they should? Secondly, I 
discuss the critique of this vision of power that was mounted by Hayek and other 
neoliberal thinkers. The critique of 'conscious' planning, modern rationalism, 
intellectual discipline was also a critique of panoptical and juridical power. Against 
Cartesian epistemologies, neoliberals asserted the primacy of embodied, instinctive 
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actors (entrepreneurs and consumers) governed by non-representative, cybernetic 
systems, of which the price system was the pre-eminent example.  Thirdly, I explore 
what form of elite power is implicit within this neoliberal critique, which is the power to 
report what numbers and embodied movements mean, or else to remain entirely 
immersed in computational systems without any public status or authority. To explore 
this, I draw on Lazzarato’s distinction between ‘subjection’ and ‘machinic 
enslavement’, where the former acts via discourse upon conscious cognition, and the 
latter acts via non-discursive semiotics, via unconscious, bodily and technological 
mechanisms (Lazzarato, 2014). The paper concludes by indicating some 
contemporary crises of this elite. 
 
The empirics of elite studies are always a thorny problem (Nader, 1972). In many 
ways, this is the terrain of investigative journalists and deeply embedded 
anthropologists, both of which have proved valuable sources in understanding 
contemporary finance. There is arguably always something scandalous about the 
concept of ‘elites’, as the very notion can imply a shortage of legitimacy or 
transparency, which in turn raises methodological and epistemological questions for 
elite sociology. This paper does not contain new empirical evidence on the existence 
or otherwise of an integrated ‘power elite’, but it does offer an interpretation of how 
the problem of elite power (including its legitimacy crisis) now presents itself. It 
develops this narrative largely on the back of published news stories and 
investigations which have managed to puncture otherwise opaque elite cultures. The 
epistemological quality of such material is ambiguous by nature, seeing as it is often 
in the form of an exposé. Sociological interpretation can nevertheless respond to 
the way in which such revelations and scandals now present themselves. There is, 
I will suggest, a qualitatively different aspect to elite power today (compared to 
Mills’ day) which becomes apparent as we read between reportage and social 
theory. This is the approach taken here.    
 
 
    
Elite jurisdictions 
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In his classic work, The Power Elite, Mills defines the power elite as "those political, 
economic, and military circles which as an intricate set of overlapping cliques share 
decisions having at least national consequences. In so far as national events are 
decided, the power elite are those who decide them" (Mills, 1999: 18). The 
institutions which the elite control, namely the state, corporations and the military, 
occupy different spheres of society, with different domains of jurisdiction. However, a 
central contention of Mills' work is that these separate institutions share a common 
characteristic, namely the extreme gradation of power separating the top from the 
bottom. Hence, those who operate at the highest level of state, corporations and 
military have more in common with each other than they do with ordinary members of 
the public or indeed with those who work in those institutions at more junior levels.  
 
Mills' critique of the power elite is simultaneously democratic and liberal in nature. It 
is democratic in the sense that the power differential between the elite and the public 
now excludes the latter from influence over decision-making. People "feel that they 
live in a time of big decisions; they know that they are not making any" (Mills, 1999: 
5). By this critical standard, the threat posed by the power elite is that they are too far 
removed from ordinary people, and effectively operating outside of or above the 
public sphere. They issue commands, which those outside of the elite are required to 
obey, by virtue of the particular means at the elite's disposal. Modernity witnesses an 
expansion in elite jurisdictions, as technology becomes more sophisticated and 
power networks become national in reach. Hence "it is the form and the height of the 
gradation of power that we must examine if we would understand the degree of 
power held and exercised by the elite" (1999: 18). By virtue of hierarchical scale and 
technological reach, the elite attain a form of positive political liberty - freedom to - 
which is not available to anybody else. In that sense, elites are an anti-democratic 
force. They are hoarders of power that would otherwise lie with the populace. 
 
While the populist tone of Mills' critique may be more emotive, it is the liberal 
argument that has been more significant for the direction of elite studies. Central to 
Mills' critique of elites is the idea that they have become not only separate from the 
demos but also integrated with each other. By virtue of their extreme seniority and 
power, they develop a shared psychology and culture, which makes their positions 
virtually interchangeable, despite the differences between the institutions below them 
(1999: 19). Most crucially, they are able to coordinate their actions so as to pursue 
deliberate political agendas together: "as the institutional mechanics of our time have 
opened up avenues to men pursuing their several interests, many of them have 
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come to see that these several interests could be realized more easily if they worked 
together" (1999: 20). Chief Executives are able to leave the running of businesses to 
the managers and bureaucrats below them, and focus their efforts on ingratiating 
themselves with politicians. Political, military and economic objectives can be 
pursued in tandem, as the idea of the 'military industrial complex' later pointed 
towards, once the power elite are working as an interconnected political entity.  
 
By arguing that the power elite is a single entity, albeit operating with different formal 
jurisdictions, Mills challenged the pluralist theory of elite power that has come to be 
associated with Dahl (Dahl, 2005), but which can also be traced to Weber and 
Schumpeter (Weber, 1991; Schumpeter, 1976). In the face of the same forces of 
modernity which Mills believed had generated a power elite, liberal pluralism states 
that participatory democracy is no longer a realistic possibility, but that a version of 
the liberal separation of powers is. With respect to democracy, Schumpeter outlined 
a theory of "competitive leadership", in which the majority were excluded from 
political decision-making, but were protected from tyranny by the conflicts between 
political parties, just as corporations and entrepreneurs would constantly challenge 
each other (1976: 269-273). Dahl famously argued against Mills that the alleged 
concentration of power in a single elite was impossible to verify empirically (Dahl, 
1958), and that US society instead retained a plurality of disconnected, mutually 
antagonistic centres of power (Dahl, 1982, 2005). The problem with elites, according 
to this view, is not the 'height' to which they have risen, but whether or not they 
operate in a coordinated fashion; Dahl believed there was no evidence that they did. 
More recently, Mizruchi has returned to this same dispute, but to argue that elite 
legitimacy is weakened precisely because elites have become decentralised and 
'fractured' (Mizruchi, 2013). This leaves them unable to take the sort of deliberate, 
coordinated approach to collective problems that Mills criticised, but which might now 
actually be welcome. 
 
Putting the empirical question of elite coordination to one side, we can see that the 
problematic of elites is one of jurisdictions, that is, of the legitimate scope of 
monopoly power. Underlying these rival positions is a Weberian question of the limits 
to instrumental rationality and technology, and a normative assumption that 
legitimacy is attained through a plurality of value spheres, even while each one may 
involve high levels of political centralisation. To employ Walzer's distinction, elites 
might (from a liberal perspective) legitimately maintain 'monopolies' over specific 
instruments or spheres of power, so long as they don't acquire 'domination' over rival 
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ones (Walzer, 1984). This is precisely how the legitimacy of professional power can 
be understood: exclusive jurisdictions run up against other exclusive jurisdictions 
(Abbott, 1988). A profession that claimed jurisdiction over everything would no longer 
be a profession, but a form of epistemological tyranny. But the critique of elite power 
- or professional power - is that the plurality of jurisdictions conceals a more 
fundamental inequality.  
 
In keeping with the Weberian premises, elites of this nature are reflexive actors, 
whose actions carry meaning for themselves and are governed by their own 
normative presuppositions or 'vocations'. Their agency is partly constituted by how 
they subjectively interpret what they are doing, that is, they know what they are 
doing, even if they can't fully articulate the norms governing how they do it. The 
exercise of elite power is conscious and 'willful', with an active subject as its driving 
force. As Savage and Williams note, the elite studies of the 1950s and '60s were 
marked by a 'humanistic' bent, that privileged the power of knowing subjects (in a 
sometimes journalistic way), and provoked the structuralist and post-structuralist 
critiques over subsequent decades which rendered elite studies somewhat outmoded 
(Savage & Williams, 2008). The locus of power shifted from reflexive agents, towards 
discourses, technologies, knowledges, diagrams, where it was performed in 
everyday life, often invisibly.  
 
But before structuralist and post-structuralist critiques had emerged, there was 
another tradition of constructivist, epistemological critique which may not have 
carried much significance for the fate of elite studies, but has arguably done much to 
transform elite power itself: neoliberalism. Emerging simultaneously with pragmatist, 
democratic critiques of expertise (which had influenced Mills), the neoliberal critique 
belonging to Hayek in particular offers another distinctive analysis of elite power 
which is more specifically epistemological in nature, and focuses on the dangers of 
'scientism' and 'conscious' public decision-making. We need to consider the 
neoliberal critique of elite power, partly so as to understand what variety of elite 
power is then possible under neoliberalism. On the basis that economic institutions, 
regulations and practices are shaped by certain 'critical capacities' (Boltanski & 
Thevenot, 1999), the neoliberal critique of elite power-knowledge is arguably of 
performative and political significance, and can help us understand what constitutes 
elites under neoliberalism. I want to suggest that it is the juridical nature of elite 
power that neoliberal critique targets, and which opens up possibilities for post-
juridical elites that are features of financialisation. Crucially, neoliberal critique targets 
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those with a reflexive, conscious sense of themselves as elites, with responsibility for 
public decision-making. But this leaves open the possibility of a different variety of 
elite, who lack this juridical or quasi-juridical orientation.   
 
  
The neoliberal critique of elites 
 
From the beginning of the socialist calculation debate in 1920, the primary target of 
neoliberal critique is the economic planner, who intends to deliver certain economic 
outcomes by force of political will and governmental rationality (Mises, 1990, 2009; 
Hayek, 1944). As a body of thought, neoliberalism can therefore be understood 
initially as a critique of economic planning, which aims to open up space for 
competitive market mechanisms, while retaining necessary elements of the 
Keynesian or socialist political economic framework (Burgin, 2012). The targets of 
this critique exist across the political spectrum, including both socialism and fascism, 
which are perceived as united in their hostility to unplanned, competitive dynamics 
(Hayek, 1944: 42).  
 
Like Mills' power elite, the planner is deemed guilty of operating outside of the 
conditions of everyday life, imposing his will upon the mass from a position of 
exteriority. Mills' complaint that people "feel that they live in a time of big decisions; 
they know that they are not making any" could equally have been made by Hayek. 
And like Mills, one of Hayek's concerns was that planners act 'consciously' and 
'deliberately', and seek to repress emergent social forces which arise spontaneously. 
Hayek argued of economic planning: 
 
We have in effect undertaken to dispense with the forces which produced 
unforeseen results and to replace the impersonal and anonymous 
mechanism of the market by collective and “conscious” direction of all social 
forces to deliberately chosen goals. 
(Hayek, 1944: 21) 
 
The liberalism - or neoliberalism - which Hayek and his associates in the Mont 
Pelerin Society (founded 1947) hoped to design would involve inverting this 
relationship, such that unplanned forces of competition would replace the power of 
'conscious' and 'deliberate' pursuit of collective ends. One might even frame this in 
Mills' own language, and suggest that in the ideal neoliberal society, people would 
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know that they did not live in a time of big decisions, but feel that they are making 
some. There are therefore some obvious resonances between a democratic New 
Left critique of elite power and a neoliberal critique of elite power, which became 
instrumental to how applied neoliberalism channelled ideals of self-expression and 
democracy into work (Boltanski & Chiapello, 2007), financial markets (Frank, 2010) 
or the freedom of capital more generally (Harvey, 2005).  
 
What distinguishes the neoliberal critique from the democratic or liberal critique is its 
attention to the epistemological limitations of centralised expertise. Mills was 
concerned by the lack of knowledge of the power elite, their instrumentalism and 
reliance on 'experts'. But this was as much a normative judgement of their intellectual 
mediocrity and 'mindless' lack of concern with teleological, substantive political 
discussion (1999: 350-356). They dominated public life, despite having no vocation 
towards it. For Hayek, by contrast, the planner was guilty of an epistemological 
arrogance, of assuming that 'objective' knowledge of social processes could over-
ride the knowledge and interpretations that were available to those who conducted 
those processes (Hayek, 1942, 1945). The planning elite purports to look upon 
society as a whole, from a position of exteriority. Contra the intellectual snobbery of 
Mills, Hayek's complaint was precisely that intellectuals possess too much power in 
circulating ideas which when coupled to the state are used to illiberal ends. The 
power elite, from a neoliberal perspective, is a Rousseauian congregation of idealists 
and social scientists who believe they know what is in the interests of all, and then 
set about establishing plans through which to pursue this. Positivist faith in the 
methodologies of social science (including economics) produced a type of 
knowledge-power formation which was dangerously abstract, aggregative and 
uniform.  
 
The epistemological ingredients of a neoliberal alternative to elite jurisdictions are 
twofold. Firstly, Hayek demanded greater respect for the knowledge which is at work 
in local, practical activity, much of which cannot be articulated or converted into 
theoretical prescriptions or rules. Someone working with physical equipment can 
know how to use it, know how it works, without being able to articulate why or 
provide an 'objective' view of the process (Hayek, 1945). The 'unconscious' nature of 
successful economic decision-making is crucial to the neoliberal critique of socialism, 
but it is equally leveled against neo-classical economists who believe that their 
calculations can be used to improve economic decision-making. Chicago School 
economists, including Knight, Friedman and Becker, all stressed the fact that 
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economics was of little use in determining the most important decisions within the 
economy. Becker, who extended neo-classical analysis to various 'non-economic' 
domains, claimed to be studying something of which individuals were not themselves 
'conscious': 
 
The economic approach does not assume that decision units are necessarily 
conscious of their efforts to maximise or can verbalise or otherwise describe 
in an informative way reasons for the systematic patterns in their behaviour.  
 (Becker, 1986: 7) 
 
While the Chicago School were practitioners of the type of positivist social science of 
which Hayek was scornful, they were also conscious of the discrepancy between the 
economistic view of society and how economic agents actually experienced their 
activities in everyday life. In Friedman's analogy, the difference was like that between 
a billiard player who is expert at using angles and a geometrician who is expert at 
predicting the passage of balls (Friedman, 1953). Economists (or geometricians) are 
not there to improve on the embodied, instinctive knowledge of businessmen or 
entrepreneurs (or billiard players), or decide how they should act. In that sense, even 
in its positivist manifestation, neoliberal economics is not a jurisdictional science, and 
lacks any specific domain of authority. If neoliberal economists still constitute an 
‘elite’, it is certainly not the same as the ‘intellectual’, which Hayek feared serve as 
“the sieve through which all new conceptions must pass before then can reach the 
masses” (1949: 374). The nature of elite decision-making is altered.  
 
With individual entrepreneurs and consumers privately employing tools and 
embodied knowledge in an unconscious way, there must then be a second 
epistemological ingredient of neoliberalism. Transmission mechanisms are needed to 
relay information between these various distributed actors. The virtue of the market is 
that it can do this in real-time and it can do so without any conscious goal. Hayek 
argues that: 
  
It is more than a metaphor to describe the price system as a kind of 
machinery for registering change, or a system of telecommunications which 
enables individual producers to watch merely the movement of a few 
pointers, as an engineer might the hands of a few dials. 
(Hayek, 1945: 527) 
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In place of a political agent, expert or intellectual taking decisions which impact upon 
the public in general, the price system acts as a cybernetic feedback system, such 
that private economic actors can constantly adjust their activities in relation to each 
other. In short, Hayek proposes replacing planners (including statisticians, 
intellectuals, social scientists) with a computational machine. In place of deliberate, 
conscious human jurisdiction being exercised over the public, there is the 
unconscious jurisdiction of 'machinery'. Before post-structuralists sought to 'cut off 
the sovereign's head', the neoliberal critique of elites had proposed replacing the 
alleged Platonists and experts who made up the socialist intelligentsia with a post-
human system for feed-back and spontaneous coordination, namely the market.  
 
The idealized neoliberal subject is therefore sandwiched between two forms of 
technology, neither of which is perceived objectively or 'consciously'. Firstly, there 
are the tools of economic activity themselves: varieties of physical, financial and 
human capital to be exploited by enterprise. The successful businessman or 
entrepreneur is most likely unable to explain why certain actions were adopted, or 
why they were successful, but take decisions unconsciously according to instinct and 
immanent circumstances. Secondly, there is the 'machinery' of the price system, 
providing constantly changing information. Hayek argues that to stop and reflect on 
the price system or question why it works might be to break it. Again, our 
unconscious engagement with this technology is crucial to its effectiveness as a 
basis for collective coordination (Hayek, 1945: 527). 
   
In this way, neoliberal critique targets all forms of Cartesian a priori, be that in the 
form of moral philosophy, social theory, methodology, formal notions of agency, 
replacing them with an embodied, contingent being who is oriented primarily towards 
various non-human forms of equipment, which include the price mechanism. The 
ideal neoliberal agent is a type of cyborg who is able to mediate constantly between 
the capital at its fingertips and the quantitative data relayed by the market, without 
stopping to reflect consciously on what it is doing. This 'dividual' is not taking 
deliberate decisions or making conscious judgments, but simply acting and reacting 
(Pickering, 2010; Halpern, 2014). It lacks a formal jurisdiction (of knowledge or 
power), beyond what it happens to be endowed with.  
 
A core paradox of neoliberalism is that the construction of this type of self-organising, 
cybernetic system would be the work of intellectuals and states. That is, an anti-elitist 
project would require a vanguard of elites in order to advance it, initially via think 
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tanks and intellectual networks, and then via sovereign states and multilateral bodies 
(Mirowski & Plehwe, 2009; Mirowski, 2013; Davies, 2014). It is no coincidence that 
neoliberal reform has depended heavily on bodies with ambiguous or weakly defined 
jurisdictions, such as think tanks or international agencies, seeing as these offer 
avenues for elite power which are not mediated by existing liberal political 
formations. Via think tanks or the 'cultural circuit of capital' (such as business 
schools) neoliberalism is able to sustain a type of flexible, post-jurisdictional elite, 
which is waged against the jurisdictional elites of state bureaucracy, academic 
disciplines and professions (Medvetz, 2012; Thrift, 2005). And while the neoliberal 
project has necessarily been mediated via jurisdictional state agencies and 
professions - especially regulators and lawyers - its advance witnessed a deliberate, 
progressive weakening of the juridical, a priori logic of these agencies and experts, 
and its replacement with new technologies of calculation (Davies, 2010). In that 
respect, the genealogy of neoliberalism is characterised by a progressive weakening 
of its 'liberal' dimension (Burgin, 2012).  
 
 
Elites reinvented 
 
The condition of neoliberal society is one of pronounced inequalities of money and 
power, but with little jurisdictional logic to sanction the types of monopolies that 
result. Categories of 'public' and 'private', 'state' and 'market', do not adequately 
delineate domains of elite power under neoliberalism. Traditional professions (such 
as doctor, teacher, lawyer) retain their epistemological jurisdictions, but are no longer 
amongst the beneficiaries of capitalist expansion (Dorling, 2014). This has 
considerable sociological significance, seeing as professions have long been viewed 
(either critically or enthusiastically) as one of the crucial anchors between capitalism 
and the liberal public sphere, or financial capital and cultural capital (Bourdieu, 1984; 
Perkin, 2003; Marquand, 2004). The exercise of disinterested judgement by 
providers of knowledge-based services enables market society to co-exist with 
norms of inclusivity and disinterestedness. Professional discourses of normalisation 
are equally integral to Foucauldian regimes of disciplinary power (Foucault, 1991).  
 
But as finance has broken away from the constraints of national regulation and 
democracy, the key agents in facilitating and profiting from this have been advisors 
and consultants (especially in Big Four accounting firms) who work constantly 
between institutions (including the state), earning fees at each point (Erturk et al, 
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2007). 'Intermediaries' of this sort may play an even greater role in the acceleration 
of inequality than CEOs (Savage & Williams, 2008). What Amoore has termed the 
'consultocracy' offers another case of a neoliberal elite which strategically avoids any 
jurisdictional monopoly, never settling on any publicly visible mode of professional, 
normative or productive identity (Amoore, 2013). The consultocracy hovers in an 
exceptional domain between public and private, while the formation of seemingly 
oxymoronic 'Limited Liability Partnerships' is a symptom of the refusal of any a priori 
public form. The expansion of a sphere of governance lying between state and 
market, namely public service outsourcing, is a further example of how the logic of 
neoliberalism shifts power away from formal jurisdictions, and into the ambiguous 
spaces which lie between or across them (Froud, et al, 2014). This ceaseless 
'skimming' of value and 'surfing' between institutions is characteristic of what Deleuze 
termed 'societies of control' (Deleuze, 1992). 
 
Corporate governance experts have their own conceptual tool with which to analyse 
these processes, borrowed from game theory: ‘agency problems’. Welfare 
economics adds another: ‘information asymmetries’. Both of these assume 
methodologically that intermediaries (such as accountants or managers or credit-
raters) will constantly be on the verge of reneging on their responsibilities towards 
their clients or ‘principles’, simply because they can. This problem of ‘temptation’ (as 
Savage and Williams characterize it) is therefore written in to the very forms of 
knowledge that are often performatively constitutive of financial institutions. From an 
orthodox perspective, the problem can be solved either through manipulating 
incentives or redistributing information. But, save for the injection of some 
behavioural economics in the post-2008 climate, it is assumed that decisions are 
taken in a primarily egoistic fashion, measured in terms of remuneration. This debars 
the possibility of normatively binding collaboration, for better or worse.  
 
The rise of shareholder value as the central goal of corporate governance (including 
of banks) in the 1980s is most emblematic of this new strategic template of 
intermediary activity (Lazonick & O’Sullivan, 2000). Echoing neoliberals such as 
Hayek and Friedman, this philosophy assumes that decision-making will be more 
socially beneficial if it is oriented towards private financial maximization, than if it 
aims at some social good. This is a deflation of the public status of senior managers, 
but at the same time a basis for vast increases in remuneration. It is this deflation of 
public status that accounts for the changing role of intermediaries elsewhere: 
services which were once delivered on a professional basis, with distinctive symbolic 
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and cultural value, become reduced to the status of market goods to be sold for a 
fee. Once they are regulated as ordinary businesses (with money an ordinary 
commodity), banks lose their extraordinary public status, and gain extraordinary 
profitability instead. The constant threat that the service-provider may renege on their 
promise to the purchaser means that they have an in-built justification for fee 
inflation, as a condition of trust-worthy behavior. As professional service firms and 
banks shifted to the status of ‘just’ businesses like any other over the 1980s and ‘90s 
(due to flotations, lobbied-for deregulations and de-mutualisations), elites became 
more intermediary and less juridical in nature.  
 
Just as the neoliberal critique of elites was mobilized via institutions with ambiguous 
or fluid jurisdictions, so the new elites which arise under neoliberalism do not fit tidily 
into hierarchical institutions, with legitimate monopolies over formally defined spheres 
of power. Nor do they form an 'overlapping clique' of the sort attacked by Mills. They 
are possessed of 'capillary power', operating in a decentralised fashion, though that 
power is not disciplinary in a normative sense. What more can we say about them? 
Given the neoliberal critique of traditional, jurisidictional elites, how might we 
conceive of the neoliberal elite differently?  
 
I suggest that, on the basis of a hermeneutics of neoliberal critique, we can identify 
two types of elite which are at work under conditions of advanced, financialised 
neoliberalism. The premise for both of these elite forms is that the 'ultimate' 
judgments or collective decisions will not be taken by 'conscious' human actors at all, 
but by the cybernetic, unconscious, non-human force of market machinery and other 
real-time feedback technologies. Hence, any type of elite power that is consistent 
with neoliberalism will not be one predicated on claims to 'ultimate' public or scientific 
authority of the elite themselves. Rather, elites come to occupy positions as 
translators of quantitative data. The price system is not the only machinery that can 
possess such authority. Recent paeans to Big Data have included the suggestion 
that managers of 'data-driven organisations' should hold no expertise of their own, 
other than knowing how to ask the right questions of data (McAfee & Brynjolfsson, 
2012). With the rise of ‘smart cities’, ‘wearable tech’ and the ‘internet of things’, 
previously unimaginable quantities of data can be collected by default to be mined at 
a later time. These offer the historically unprecedented “possibility of experiencing 
something not immediately available to consciousness” (Hansen, 2015: 139). 
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The first elite form is one where the agent exists to mediate between two non-human 
semiotic systems. These might be termed 'cyborg intermediaries'. In the case of 
financial elites, these semiotic systems are vastly complex assemblages of prices, 
computer screens, cables, software, terminals and so on. In contrast to the 
professional banker, whose cultural and social capital needed constant tending as a 
form of discursive exclusion (Augar, 2008), the neoliberal financial elite excludes by 
virtue of semiotic complexity, little of which is mediated by humans at all (Haldane, et 
al, 2012). Just as the Hayekian entrepreneur is sandwiched between two forms of 
technology - capital to be exploited and prices to communicate information - the new 
financial elite responds to technological cues without conscious reflection or 
discursive deliberation. This is a domain of power that lies beyond the purview of 
most public institutions or even the executives which are ostensibly accountable for 
it. The acts of translation which are performed by ‘cyborg intermediaries’ are from 
one esoteric code into another, rather than from code into narrative. It is quite apt 
that much of the sociology of this terrain has been within the tradition of Science and 
Technology Studies (e.g. Lepinay, 2011).  
 
Elites of this nature may be very highly remunerated, but they possess no real 
autonomy, power or authority in the liberal or Weberian sense of those terms. Not 
unlike the consumer, who receives cues from advertising or 'nudges' from policy, 
then displays a behaviour change as a result, the majority of financial elites are 
receivers and processors of information. They are not endowed with liberal 
subjectivity, but rather are victims of what Lazzarato terms 'machinic enslavement', in 
which non-discursive, 'asignifying semiotics' govern and enact decisions (Lazzarato, 
2014). In contrast to processes of ‘subjection’, which produce certain types of human 
self-consciousness and reflexive understanding (such as discourses of 
‘entrepreneurship’ or ‘choice’), ‘machinic enslavement’ renders the person a “gear, a 
cog, a component part in the “business” and “financial” assemblage” (2014: 25). The 
machinery of contemporary capitalism mobilizes "partial and modular subjectivities, 
non-reflexive consciousnesses and modes of enunciation that do not originate in the 
individuated subject" (2014: 89). This is precisely the type of non-Cartesian, 
'unconscious' agency that Hayek viewed as the driver of spontaneous organisation.  
 
Beyond the neo-classical assumptions of 'human capital' or 'rational choice', 
Lazzarato suggests that financial traders have no humanity that is distinguishable 
from the machines that govern them: 
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Instead of a rational subject who controls information and his choices, homo 
economicus is a mere terminal of asignifying, symbolic, and signifying 
semiotics and of non-linguistic constituents which for the most part escape his 
awareness. We are not only well beyond the individualism and rationality of 
homo economicus, we have moved beyond "cognitive capitalism".   
(Lazzarato, 2014: 100). 
 
Central to Lazzarato's argument is the notion that non-discursive languages of 
machines are not representations of reality, but "simulate and pre-produce a reality 
that does not yet exist, a reality that is only virtually present" (2014: 86). This is 
another way of saying that machinic semiotics is 'performative', just as the social 
studies of finance has shown with respect to economics in certain circumstances 
(MacKenzie, 2006; MacKenzie et al, 2007). We should also note that price itself is a 
performative or non-representational type of sign, in the sense that it only exists by 
virtue of its representation (and chains of representation). A price that was not 
communicated would not be the price.  
 
Traders surrounded by screens of price data are not, therefore, subjects viewing 
signifiers of some absent reality, but agents within a reality of telecommunications 
and information processors. "The sign flows circulating from computer to computer in 
real time constitute a reality that is as objective as material flows" (Lazzarato, 2014: 
96). Decisions are taken along the way, but they are not taken at some 'objective' 
distance on the basis of conscious reflection or deliberation. They are effects of the 
system, which now includes the behaviors, bodies, brains of those employed by it. 
These cyborg intermediaries are defined in terms of their capacity to sense what is 
going on in real-time, not to perceive it at a distance (Hansen, 2015). Neuro-
economics, aimed at understanding the biological substrates of choice, is predicated 
on the assumption that choice is no longer a property of an autonomous subject any 
longer, but of somatic sensors and transmitters (Dow Schull & Zaloom, 2011). Neural 
supplements aimed at traders, such as TruBrain, are an obvious step for ‘cyborg 
intermediaries’ whose powers of ‘choice’ are critical to the functioning of the whole 
machine. The rise of automated, high-frequency trading suggests that the need for 
human cyborgs within the financial system is not guaranteed in the long term (Ford, 
2015; Lewis, 2015).  
 
The second elite form is also one which privileges powers of translation, but here it is 
between the cybernetic, financial, market system and the liberal polity which that 
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system now dominates. The neoliberal critique of jurisdictional elites, which seeks to 
elevate machinic systems to the status of ultimate authorities, does not necessarily 
seek to eliminate spheres of discursive deliberation, politics, public judgement, 
professional authority, regulation and liberal normativity, it merely seeks to usurp and 
constrain them. There is therefore a need for 'diplomatic intermediaries', capable of 
straddling both worlds, although the relationship between the two is highly 
asymmetrical. While charismatic central bank governors have the capacity (utilized or 
not) to speak politically against the financial system, the financial system has a far 
greater power to mobilize against politics. Successful CEOs of 'financialised' firms 
are those which can offer narratives about strategy that confirm the primacy of 
finance (Froud et al, 2006). In Lazzarato’s terms, these elites are skilled in moving 
between spheres of ‘signifiying semiotics’ (explanations, justifications, proposals etc) 
and ‘asignifying semiotics’ (codes, data, processes etc).  
 
Where 'diplomatic intermediaries' are arguably most crucial is in translating the mood 
of 'the markets' to political agents and states. Both the power and the opacity of the 
neoliberal system derive from the fact that numbers alone do not communicate their 
own meaning. As Streeck argues with respect to austerity measures,  
 
From the viewpoint of 'the markets', a structurally sound budget is one that 
has sufficient reserves and institutional flexibility... The precise point at which 
this is attained remains open; much as 'the markets' want clarity from 
governments, they are not prepared to give it themselves. 
(Streeck, 2014: 112-113) 
 
The quantitative data of statistics, market prices, bond yields, Big Data, returns on 
capital do not signify anything, until their significance is provided by practices of 
interpretation. The liberal public sphere therefore plays an indispensable role in 
providing human narratives about non-human mechanisms. To use Hansen’s 
distinction, sensations are converted into perceptions (2015). For example, during 
the depths of the Euro crisis in 2012, the media regularly featured employees of 
investment banks declaring that the Euro could not survive - not a judgement of the 
particular banker, but their interpretation of the judgement of the bond markets. A 
more famous example was the well-known case in which Alan Greenspan informed 
the newly appointed President Clinton that if he pursued any of his new spending 
plans, Greenspan would have no choice but to raise interest rates to prevent a 
weakening of the dollar, risking a recession (Reich, 2013). These 'diplomatic 
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intermediaries' are not claiming jurisdictional authority within the public sphere, but 
merely acting as rapporteurs of what they understand is going on in the unconscious 
world occupied by millions of 'cyborg intermediaries'.  
 
This asymmetrical relationship creates a lucrative opportunity to traditional elites 
located within the liberal public sphere (professions, media outlets, universities etc) 
to reconfigure themselves as 'diplomatic intermediaries', whose job it is to interpret 
and communicate the meanings of finance (and associated machinery) for the 
benefit of public audiences. Rather than enact a judgement in a jurisdictional sense, 
an interpretation of the facts is provided instead. Hence, accountants, auditors and 
credit-raters are reconfigured as delegates providing a public account of what is 
going on beyond the understanding of the public. Universities, consultants and the 
'cultural circuit of capital' develop languages and narratives about what is taking 
place, beyond the realms of public discourse, just as the early protagonists of 
neoliberal thought produced narratives of 'enterprise' and 'competitiveness' as a 
cultural, normative accompaniment to a system that circumvents narrative altogether. 
While such narratives command public acceptance, the rewards available to those 
within the financial system (the 'cyborg intermediaries') can be justified on 
'meritocratic' grounds to those outside of the system (Lazzarato, 2014: 100).   
 
The relationship between finance and states may be the pre-eminent case of this 
diplomatic elite power. But there are other cases in which ‘diplomatic intermediaries’ 
occupy a critical role in translating the meaning of unconscious cybernetic systems. 
The business and policy applications of behavioral sciences and neurosciences 
requires gurus capable of communicating what brains or bodies are 'doing', 'wanting', 
'feeling', in ways that does not involve the voice of the subject(s) under observation. 
Cartesian language is super-imposed upon otherwise anti-Cartesian, cybernetic 
accounts of agency (producing manifold philosophical contradictions in the process) 
(Bennett & Hacker, 2003). The rise of Big Data privileges those capable of mediating 
between mathematical analytics and empirical narratives about what is being 
represented (Andrejevic, 2013). Numbers, bodies, brain activity and behaviors are 
not self-narrating, and their significance can never just emerge of its own accord. In 
these cases, the asymmetric relationship is reversed, and the unconscious, 
distributed system is represented in ways in which it can be controlled by marketers, 
managers, 'nudges', security services and so on. 
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Conclusion: new crises of elites?  
    
What Savage and Williams term the "capillary power" of finance helps us to 
understand why contemporary elites seem to evade public judgement and lack 
visible public jurisdictions. This new distribution and ontology of power undoubtedly 
marks a shift away from the Millsian definition of elites, as those who took conscious 
decisions, with national consequences, often in alliance with each other. This article 
has sought to add some further nuance, both to that notion of capillary power and to 
how new elites are conceived as a result. In particular, it is important to recognise the 
extent to which neoliberal thought is also a critique of elites in the Millsian sense, 
undermining modes of jurisdictional authority over designated domains of power and 
value, and instating new types of information circuits and intermediary power, which 
potentially bi-pass or subvert the liberal public sphere. The Hayekian critique of 
'conscious' planning opens up space for new types of elite, who are either unreflexive 
regarding their power, or adopt the role of powerful interpreters mediating between 
the 'unconscious', cybernetic world of finance and that of politics. Both of these are 
possessed of powers of translation, rather than of public decision. I've termed these 
elites 'cyborg intermediaries' and 'diplomat intermediaries' respectively, using 
Lazzarato's distinction between subjective, signifying semiotics and machinic, 
asignifying semiotics, to theorise these different types of elite power.  
 
The inability to exert judgement over finance - an inability which finds expression in 
the demand for bankers' prison sentences, oaths to be sworn, a seizing of their 
assets and so on - is a function of the exceptional status accorded to finance within 
the neoliberal system. The technology of financial markets comes to occupy the 
place traditionally held by elites, of the Millsian variety, hence there are no deliberate, 
coordinated, ‘big’ decisions being taken over the public, legitimately or otherwise. 
Neoliberal elites, to the extent that they engage in public discourse, expend 
considerable efforts explaining why there is no alternative to the rule of finance, as 
manifest in austerity policies.  
 
Yet this system is clearly not immune to forms of legitimation crisis. As the public 
narratives of 'competitiveness' and 'meritocracy' lose plausibility (as they have done 
since 2008), questions turn to what really goes on inside the secret, machinic 
languages of the financial system. Concerns about inequality have now penetrated 
the very bodies that were once credited with spreading neoliberal ideas, such as the 
World Economic Forum and the IMF. Yet aside from such public breakdowns of 
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hegemony in a traditional sense (and whose impact upon the cybernetic system of 
finance is not guaranteed), the analysis presented here also provides a theorisation 
of new types of crisis that will strike under advanced, financialised neoliberalism. 
‘Post-hegemonic systems’ of domination are still victims of legitimacy crises, 
although these do not necessarily weaken them, given they are not dependent on 
Gramscian or Weberian norms of legitimation in the first place.  
 
The archetypal financial agent, as characterized by Lazzarato, does not exercise 
conscious, reflexive subjectivity, but operates amidst computer programmes and 
market systems which render the trader a type of cyborg, processing information, 
according to routines and scripts produced by machines. But when such an agent 
suddenly discovers their subjectivity, reflects on their situation, consciously decides 
to act, then the outcome is unpredictable and political. Most likely it will be some act 
of fraud or corruption – a giving way to temptation - such as those that came to 
symbolise the rotten state of finance post-2008. And yet the difference between 
'scandals' and ordinary financial activity lies partly in protagonists being caught, and 
partly in 'deliberate' nature of a plot. Finance also normalises practices of 
representational distortion, such as the elimination of 'profit' for purposes of tax 
avoidance, but in a way that is in keeping with the systemic format (Sikka & Willmott, 
2013). Normal acts of profitable re-signification, as conducted by the Big Four, are 
not classed as ‘scandalous’. 
 
The flipside of this sudden eruption of subjectivity amidst a world of 'asignifying 
semiotics' is the phenomenon of whistle-blowing, whereby elites in the position of 
'cyborg intermediaries' (processing information, not exercising conscious subjectivity) 
dramatically take it upon themselves to enter the public sphere as 'diplomat 
intermediaries' or to facilitate leaks. Industries and agencies which process large 
amounts of data are vulnerable to this ethical reorientation or 'hacker ethic', of which 
Edward Snowden is perhaps the most prominent case. The possible ends to which 
the hacker, fraudster or whistle-blower puts this power are limitless. As 
organisations, cities and private lives become increasingly 'data-driven', but still 
dependent on some form of human agency, new opportunities for conscious 
manipulations and disruptions will arise. Scandals surrounding the app-based taxi 
network Uber (such as awarding senior managers the ‘God View’ which tracks the 
movements of individual account holders without their knowledge) give a sense of 
how the boundary between ‘unconscious’ and ‘conscious’ forms of cognition is 
penetrated as form of power.    
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 Attention needs to be paid to both the machinery and the discourses of elite power. 
Mills defined the project of elite studies as follows: 
 
For every epoch and for every social structure, we must work out an answer 
to the question of the power of the elite. The ends of men are often merely 
hopes, but means are facts within some men's control. That is why all means 
of power tend to become ends to an elite that is in command of them. And 
that is why we may define the power elite in terms of the means of power - as 
those who occupy the command posts. 
(Mills, 1999: 23) 
 
The hacker or the whistle-blower may not resemble elites of the sociological variety 
studied by Mills. But neoliberalism, and digital financialisation, force us to reconsider 
both the "means" within some men's control, and also the particular location of the 
command posts. What Lazzarato terms 'machinic enslavement' means that, even 
those who have the means of power at their finger-tips, this rarely translates into a 
reflexive self-consciousness of being in 'command', save for when they 
unaccountably decide to seize this potential. Meanwhile, there are various 
intermediaries - former professionals, ex-intellectuals, one-time journalistic 
institutions - willing to work as the interpreters of what the financial machine is saying 
from one moment to the next, as a condition of attaining economic security. Yet the 
political instability of the system resides in the fact that the means of power are so 
complex, so distributed, that possibilities for the exercise of a public decision could 
be taken at any point in a chain.  
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